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ALL FAMILIES ARE EQUAL, BUT DO SOME
MATTER MORE THAN OTHERS? HOW
GENDER, POVERTY, AND DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE PUT QUEBEC’S FAMILY LAW
REFORM TO THE TEST
Suzanne Zaccour*
Who needs family law? While it is tempting to answer
“everyone”, the stakes are not the same for all. I propose
to evaluate family law rules in terms of how they address
high-stakes situations—that is, the condition of vulnerable
women. Thus, the test of good family law should be how
well it deals with poverty and domestic violence, factors
that directly constrain women’s ability to negotiate fair
outcomes.
To explore this method, I take the example of a
recent proposal, developed by Alain Roy’s reform
committee (the “Comité consultatif sur le droit de la
famille”), and regarding which the Quebec government
held public consultations in 2019. I show that this reform
proposal, which purports to respond to the diversity of
Quebec families, rather prioritizes a single ideal of the
modern, equal, and autonomous family. The reform’s
supposedly autonomy-enhancing rules would especially
penalize poor and victimized women—thus failing my
proposed test of good family law. These women, I argue,
should be considered model test cases, not exceptions.
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INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE OF FAMILY
LAW
Denise, of thirty-two years, is a white, middle-class dentist.
Irma is a racialized immigrant housekeeper who does not
know French or English. Victoria is unemployed and the
victim of conjugal violence. Odile is a sixty-seven-year-old
widow.1
These are but a fraction of the life circumstances
that family law must tackle. Diversity in age, gender,
sexual orientation, race, class, ability, legal knowledge, and
many more areas makes designing family laws suitable for
all a monumental challenge. Can the law be equally
responsive to all personal circumstances and family
relationships, and, if not, whose interests should come
first?
One response to this puzzle is minimalistic
regulation, where individuals are free to adjust the fit.
Another option is to regulate for paradigmatic cases and
hope that residual freedom and discretion will
accommodate other needs. Before endorsing one approach
over the other, let us ponder: who, among our four
characters, needs family law the most? Who needs it the
least?
Here, I propose that family law should focus on
difficult cases—in particular, women with little legal
*

DPhil candidate in Law at Oxford University. The author thanks the
anonymous reviewers for their precious feedback.

1

Tips for recalling the names of our characters: Denise: dentist; Irma:
immigrant; Victoria: victim; Odile: old.
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knowledge or economic power, and women in violent
relationships—rather than building schemes around an
ideal of the equal and independent couple. Poverty and
domestic violence raise the stakes of family regulation and
exacerbate the need for good law. We must, then, legislate
for Victoria, not for Denise.
To illustrate this argument and put it to the test, I
critique, with the help of our protagonists, a proposal for
the reform of Quebec family law. The project, presented in
the recommendations of Alain Roy’s reform committee
and in a public consultation held by the Quebec
government in 2019, would slash important family law
protections.2 It proposes abolishing the mandatory sharing
of family patrimony, changing the default matrimonial
regime from the sharing of acquests to the sharing of only
family patrimony, and introducing a scheme for regulating
cohabiting parents based on the compensation of some
relationship-generated disadvantages.
This public consultation attracted strong
opposition.3 While purporting to respond to the diversity of
relationships in modern society, the reform speaks to an
2

See Québec, Ministère de la Justice, Public Consultation on Family
Law Reform, by Sonia LeBel (Québec: Gouvernement du Québec,
2019), online (pdf):
<www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/contenu/documents/
En__Anglais_/centredoc/publications/ministere/dossiers/consultation/
document_consultation-a.pdf> [Ministère de la Justice, “Family Law
Reform”].

3

See “Submitted briefs”, online: Ministère de la justice
<www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/en/department/issues/family/submittedbriefs>. These are the briefs sent in response to the public
consultation.
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archetypical autonomous, egalitarian family. This overly
optimistic appraisal of family life in modern Quebec
society could have dramatic consequences for families who
deviate from this ideal and who are the most vulnerable.
In this article, I first expose the proposed reform
and its assumptions of formal equality and individualistic
autonomy. I then develop what I suggest should be the test
of good family law: how well it deals with the situation of
women who have little economic power or who are in
violent relationships. I apply this test to the reform proposal
and call on our four protagonists to help us see how the
changes would penalize women, especially those who
cannot exercise a fantasized autonomy due to poverty or
intimate partner violence. Finally, I expose three fatal flaws
in how the reform proposal deals with autonomy, the
public/private interaction, and inequality, before pointing
to fairer alternatives.
My conclusions have implications beyond
Quebec’s latest reform proposal: regulating stubbornly
unequal yet rapidly changing family relationships in a fair
manner is a challenge that still confounds jurisdictions
across the world.
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THE CONTEXT: WHERE WE MEET A
PROPOSED REFORM SERVING AUTONOMY,
FORMAL EQUALITY, AND THE IDEAL LEGAL
SUBJECT
My analysis is based on a reform proposal put together by
the Comité consultatif sur le droit de la famille (the “Roy
Committee”).4 In June 2019, the Quebec government held
public consultations on some of the Roy Committee’s
recommendations. At the time of writing this article, no bill
has been made public. Hence, we do not know what the
expected reform will ultimately look like. Nevertheless, the
Roy Committee’s report (the “Roy Report”) is a great
starting point to present my argument on the test of good
family law, the importance of domestic violence, and the
meaning of autonomy. Moreover, the Roy Report will
likely continue to constitute a tempting starting point for
family law reforms in the years to come. Hence, my
arguments will remain relevant regardless of the fate of this
particular reform project. Before getting into these
arguments, some context is called for.

4

Comité consultatif sur le droit de la famille (sous la présidence de
Alain Roy), Pour un droit de la famille adapté aux nouvelles réalités
conjugales et familiales (Québec: Ministère de la Justice du Québec,
2015), online (pdf):
<www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/contenu/documents/
Fr__francais_/centredoc/rapports/couplefamille/droit_fam7juin2015.pdf> [The Roy Report].
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THE CONTEXT FOR THE ROY REPORT
Family law reform is long-awaited, as “[t]he last major
reform of family law took place in 1980.”5 A 2013
Supreme Court decision intensified the need for reform: the
Court had to decide whether the differential treatment of
married and unmarried couples in Quebec was
unconstitutional.6 Supreme Court Justice Abella’s camp
found unjustified discrimination of unmarried couples,7
while Supreme Court Justice LeBel’s camp saw no
infringement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.8 Chief Justice McLachlin’s deciding vote that
the Quebec regime constituted a justified infringement of
the right to equality sealed the fate of the case.9
This decision left Quebec as the only Canadian
province not to recognize any default obligation between
unmarried partners. The government tasked a committee
(the Comité consultatif sur le droit de la famille), led by
notary Alain Roy, with reviewing the entirety of family
law. Although more modest in scope, the government’s
proposed reform can be traced back to identical proposals
in the Roy Committee’s report, submitted in June 2015.10
Given this context, it is surprising that the proposed
5

See Ministère de la Justice, “Family Law Reform”, supra note 2 at 5.

6

See Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5.

7

See ibid at para 377 (Deschamps, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ
found that only the exclusion from support was not justified: para
382).

8

See ibid at para 282.

9

See ibid at para 449.

10

See The Roy Report, supra note 4.
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changes do so little for de facto couples and rearrange so
much of a matrimonial regime that was not generating
commotion.
Indeed, the reform proposes ending the mandatory
sharing of family patrimony, changing the default
matrimonial regime from a partnership of acquests to
family patrimony,11 and establishing minimal imperative
protections for parents, married or not.12 Under the new
imperative parental regime, all couples with children
would have to contribute to the expenses of the family, the
family residence would be protected, and economic redress
would be possible through a compensatory allowance.13
THE PROPOSED REFORM’S THEORETICAL
UNDERPINNINGS
The proposed reform is based on neo-liberal assumptions.
For instance, it echoes the Roy Committee’s faith in
contractualization and personal autonomy as central values
in family law.14 These principles fall squarely within a
formal equality approach: “family law must reflect the
formal equality of the spouses, whether married or not, by
leaving them free to arrange the legal aspects of their
relationship.”15 The couple is imagined as “a space of

11

See Ministère de la Justice, “Family Law Reform”, supra note 2 at
19.

12

See ibid at 8.

13

See ibid at 9–10.

14

See ibid at 14.

15

Ibid at 7.
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autonomy of will and freedom of contract.”16 Whether the
couple is indeed a space of autonomy is, of course,
debatable. Victoria might disagree.
Further, the reform project is centred on a specific
model of family life: independent partners and
interdependent parents. The Committee views “[s]hared
responsibility for a child as the main source of
interdependence”:17
The fact that two spouses live together in a
marriage or de facto union does not
necessarily
mean
that
they
are
interdependent; this is not the case, for
example, for two people who form a couple
at the age of [sixty-five] or two young adults
who both have a career and are financially
independent. However, the birth of a child
will generally create a situation of
interdependence for the parents.18
Here we can recognize Odile and Denise. Odile is
past the age of childbearing. Denise represents the young
professional who is too modern to carry in their
relationship the passé marks of inequality. The Committee
16

Québec, Ministère de la Justice, Consultation publique sur la réforme
du droit de la famille (Québec: Gouvernement du Québec, 2019) at 7,
online (pdf):
<www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/contenu/documents/
Fr__francais_/centredoc/publications/ministere/dossiers/consultation/
document_consultation.pdf> [Author translation].

17

Ministère de la Justice, “Family Law Reform”, supra note 2 at 7.

18

See ibid at 8.
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rejects a default regime based on needs or income sharing,
preferring a clean-break compensatory regime that treats
inequality within the couple as an exception to the norm.
By leaving tremendous space for couples to create
their own rules, the reform presumes informed and
proactive legal subjects with the financial means, cognitive
capacity, and time to make these decisions. The
minimalistic regime reflects the idea that the couple knows
what is best and can achieve fairness even if the weaker
party is less protected. After all, there is no weaker party in
a modern couple.
The reform strives for “[a]n inclusive response
adapted to the diversity of couples and families.”19 We
might think of “inclusive” as protecting even the most
vulnerable, but here “inclusive[ness]” stands for
recognizing new and modern forms of family (for example,
young professionals, same-gender couples) who
presumably do not need protection. The reform committee
writes:
Family law must not be used to legitimize one
model for couples or families to the detriment
of others. Instead, it must adapt to the
diversity of and differences between families
that are characteristic of Québec society.20
However, because the rules are centred on the
autonomous, equal, and independent legal subject—an
idealized model—the Committee does the opposite of
19

Ibid at 7.

20

Ibid.
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recognizing a diversity of families and needs. It abandons
those who cannot pay the price of contractual freedom:
people without legal knowledge or financial means (like
Irma), and people within unequal relationships who cannot
negotiate on equal footing (like Victoria).
Finally, the Committee anticipates “[c]itizens
aware of their rights and obligations” who can make
enlightened decisions in “[a]n accessible family justice
system”21—another excess of optimism which clashes with
reality.22
All in all, the reform presents a rosy narrative of the
free and autonomous legal subject. A logic of atomistic
liberalism augurs badly for ordinary women living under
conditions of patriarchy. While “[p]rivate ordering is not
per se a bad thing, provided it is done fairly,” the reform
fails to ensure these conditions of fairness and “sacrifices
substantive fairness to formalistic notions of choice.”23

21

Ibid.

22

See Hélène Belleau, Quand l’amour et l’État rendent aveugle: le
mythe du mariage automatique (Québec: PUQ, 2012) [Belleau, le
mythe du mariage automatique] on how and why unmarried partners
are unaware of their rights and obligations.

23

Martha Shaffer, “Domestic Contracts, Part II: The Supreme Court’s
Decision in Hartshorne v. Hartshorne” (2004) 20:2 Can J Fam L 261
at 289 (discussing Hartshorne v Hartshorne, 2004 SCC 22).
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THE METHOD: TESTING FAMILY LAW BY
FOCUSING ON GENDER, POVERTY, AND
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
How should we evaluate a reform proposal to decide if it is
good law? I suggest that rules should be put to the test of
gender, violence, and poverty. That is, a law that ignores
poor women suffering domestic violence cannot be good
law, while a law centred on their needs is more likely to
work for everyone. Thus, thinking about law requires
particularization, rather than abstract and gender-blind
concepts of legal subjects and families.
WHY GENDER MATTERS: AVOIDING SEXIST
BIASES IN FAMILY LAW
Laws that are insensitive to gender generate biases against
women.24 Law reform is an already complicated and
unpredictable process: it should not, on top of that, be
grounded on a myth, such as the existence of gender
equality. Thus, feminist scholars have called for family law
to be thought of from the perspective of women, consistent
with the legislative method of gender-based analysis that
“[s]eek[s] to ensure that before policy decisions are taken,

24

See e.g. Susan B Boyd, Child Custody, Law, and Women’s Work
(Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2003) on gender biases in
family law. See also Suzanne Zaccour, “Crazy Women and Hysterical
Mothers: The Gendered Use of Mental-Health Labels in Custody
Disputes” (2018) 31:1 Can J Fam L 57; Suzanne Zaccour, “Parental
Alienation in Quebec Custody Litigation” (2018) 59:4 C de D 1073.
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an analysis of their impact on women and men,
respectively, is carried out.”25
Gender-sensitivity is called for not because women
and men are essentially different, but because their realities
are distinct. John Langston Gwaltney wrote in 1980 that
“[t]he mind of the man and the mind of the woman is the
same . . . but this business of living makes women use their
minds in ways that men don’t even have to think about.”26
Women are more likely to suffer intimate partner violence,
earn less than their male partner, and undertake more
unpaid domestic work. In Quebec, sixty percent of
minimum-wage workers are women, and women earn
$2.55 less per hour than men.27 Women who work full-time
like their partners do sixty-two percent of domestic work;
working women whose partner does not work still do fortynine percent of that work.28 Susan Boyd also calls attention
to the fact that “the oft-mentioned ‘child poverty’ is

25

World Conference on Women, “Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action” The IV World Conference on Women, 1995, 16th Plen Mtg
at 86, online (pdf): United Nations
<www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/Beijing_Declaration_and_Pl
atform_for_Action.pdf >.

26

John Langston Gwaltney, Drylongso: A Self-Portrait of Black
America (New York: Random House, 1980) at 33.

27

See Observatoire de la pauvreté et des inégalités au Québec,
“Femmes et pauvreté” (12 October 2015) at 1, online (pdf): Collectif
pour un Québec sans pauvreté, <pauvrete.qc.ca/IMG/pdf/151015femmespauvretemontage.pdf>.

28

Ibid.
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inextricably linked to women’s poverty.”29 Indeed, one in
three woman-led single-parent families are poor, compared
to one in seven man-led single-parent families.30
A law that does not recognize gender differences
cannot remedy, and indeed risks aggravating, these
inequalities. As put by Kimberlé Crenshaw, the mother of
intersectionality, “[i]t is fairly obvious that treating
different things the same can generate as much an
inequality as treating the same things differently.”31 As
such, feminist family law scholars have exposed “[t]the
pitfalls of a formal equality approach in family law . . . on
both theoretical and empirical levels.”32 Boyd concludes
that “gender-neutral legal norms . . . sit uncomfortably next
to familial realities that remain stubbornly gendered and
unequal.”33

29

Susan B Boyd, “Can Law Challenge the Public/Private Divide?
Women, Work, and Family” (1996) 15 Windsor YB Access Just 161
at 173.

30

See Observatoire de la pauvreté et des inégalités au Québec, supra
note 27 at 2.

31

Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, “Color blindness, history, and the law”
in Wahneema Lubiano, ed, The House That Race Built (New York:
Pantheon, 1997) 280 at 285.

32

Susan B Boyd, “Equality: An Uncomfortable Fit in Parenting Law” in
Robert Leckey, ed, After Legal Equality: Family, Sex, Kinship (New
York: Routledge, 2015) 42 at 43.

33

Ibid at 42.
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THE CHALLENGE OF MARGINALIZATION AND
INTERSECTIONALITY
The necessity of gender-sensitive analyses is nothing new,
and indeed the current challenge for feminists is rather to
engage in truly intersectional thinking that does not
subordinate other identities (particularly race) to gender.
Centring family law exclusively around privileged white
women fails to challenge interlocking power structures.
Intersectional legal scholars thus propose evaluating the
law in terms of the situation of marginalized women. For
example, black feminism advocates centring racialized
women in the fight against patriarchy and white supremacy
in order to free all women. As Patricia Hill Collins explains
in her book Black Feminist Thought, centring black women
does not mean decentring others or engaging in a merely
comparative exercise.34 It means going to the root of the
oppression of women and black people, recognizing the
dual allegiances of black women to both their race and their
gender, and understanding the deep interdependence
between the structures of patriarchy and other forms of
power relations.35
These teachings are relevant to my project of
testing and criticizing autonomy-centric reform proposals.
34

See Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge,
Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (New York:
Routledge, 2000) at vii–viii, 124–25.

35

See ibid. See also Chris Weedon, 2nd ed, Feminist Practice and
Poststructuralist Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); Kimberle
Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics” (1989) U Chicago Legal F 139.
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Indeed, one of the consequences of centring reflections
about the family around white, middle-class women is the
assumption that women and children enjoy the economic
security and the racial privilege that enable them “to see
themselves primarily as individuals in search of personal
autonomy, instead of members of racial ethnic groups
struggling for power.”36 Such assumptions fall prey to the
“decontextualization of Western social thought overall.”37
Thus, the feminist project of centring the margins is
intrinsically linked to the feminist project of challenging
neo-liberal conceptions of autonomy.
WHY POVERTY MATTERS: RAISING THE
STAKES IN FAMILY DISPUTES
Among the circumstances represented in my characters’
stories, I want to draw attention to poverty and domestic
violence because of how directly they affect a person’s
autonomy to utilize the law for their benefit, safety, and
well-being.
As we know, the law is inaccessible to most
citizens. In 2012, the Canadian Department of Justice
estimated that “between [forty percent] and [fifty-seven
percent] of parties are self-represented when they appear in

36

Patricia Hill Collins, “Shifting the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist
Theorizing about Motherhood” in Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Grace
Chang & Linda Rennie Forcey, eds, Mothering Ideology, Experience,
and Agency (New York: Routledge, 1994) 45 at 48.

37

Ibid at 45.
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court for family law issues.”38 This proportion is on the
rise,39 and most self-represented litigants cite lack of means
as their reason for self-representing.40
Poverty also means comparatively higher
transaction and outcome costs for litigants. For rich
couples, the difference between one matrimonial regime
and another is significant in amount, hence the practice of
signing prenuptial agreements in higher social classes.
Relative to their finances, however, affluent people do not
face high risks. For someone in a situation of precarity,
alimony or protection of family patrimony can
dramatically impact their standard of life, their health, and
their ability to care for their children. Money has
diminishing returns, as empirical studies in positive
psychology
and
behavioural
economics
have
demonstrated.41 Should family law not primarily concern
itself with people whose well-being and survival, rather
than third car, is at stake?
For the state, the stakes in family disputes are also
higher with regard to underprivileged legal subjects.
Different legal rules can decide between private and state
support. A more protective regime frees state resources by
ensuring that indigent litigants receive basic assistance.
38

Canada, Department of Justice, JustFacts: Self-Represented Litigants
in Family Law (Ottawa: DOJ, June 2016), online:
<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/divorce/jf-pf/srl-pnr.html>.

39

See ibid.

40

See ibid.

41

See e.g. Daniel Kahneman & Angus Deaton, “High Income Improves
Evaluation of Life But Not Emotional Well-Being” (2010) 107:38
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 16489.
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While private solutions to poverty are disputable,42 they
may be the only solution in the context of right-leaning
governments.
The access to justice discourse connects poverty to
the challenges of law-making at the procedural level: we
need accessible courts, legal education, legal aid, etcetera.
My article draws attention to the ways in which centring
preoccupations about poverty informs substantive law, and
especially the choice of default protective rules.
WHY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MATTERS:
SAFETY OVER AUTONOMY
I want to add conjugal violence to the intersectional mantra
of gender, race, class, and sexuality.43 Granted, domestic
violence is not a permanent identity along an axis of
oppression. Yet I argue that it is an important category that
must be recognized and centred in feminist thought and not
merely seen as a circumstance among others that happens
to certain women. Domestic violence is central to family
law. With my proposed test of family law, I am calling for
scholars to treat domestic violence not as an exception, but
rather as a paradigmatic case.

42

See e.g. Brenda Cossman, “Family Feuds: Neo-Liberal and NeoConservative Visions of the Reprivatization Project” in Brenda
Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds, Privatization, Law, and the Challenge
to Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 169; Susan
B Boyd, “Family, Law and Sexuality: Feminist Engagements” (1999)
8:3 Soc & Leg Stud 369 at 380.

43

I voluntarily omit ability and species from this list as they are far
from systematically integrated to even intersectional analyses.
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First and foremost, we need to end the process of
denial that allows most of society to see domestic violence
as rare. Countless studies across the world have
documented its ubiquity.44 Hence, intimate partner
violence cannot be treated as an exception, even less so
among litigating families45 where an even higher
proportion of women has been victimized by their
partner.46
Another reason to give conjugal violence more
attention is that in situations of violence, getting the law
right is of paramount importance—possibly a matter of life
or death. When the law communicates to victims of
domestic violence that a separation would have disastrous
consequences, they are dissuaded from leaving. Thus, a
law that does not help separating women achieve fair and
safe outcomes is complicit in their entrapment.
Moreover, in direct opposition to the reform’s
atomistic liberalism, agreements negotiated within
coercive relationships are unlikely to be any more
autonomy-enhancing than state-imposed solutions.47 This
is important because the ability to contract out of default
44

See e.g. Eline Leen et al, “Prevalence, Dynamic Risk Factors and the
Efficacy of Primary Interventions for Adolescent Dating Violence:
An International Review” (2013) 18:1 Aggression & Violent
Behavior 159.

45

See e.g. Douglas A Brownridge, “Violence Against Women PostSeparation” (2006) 11:5 Aggression & Violent Behavior 514.

46

See e.g. Boyd, supra note 32 at 44.

47

See Demie Kurz, “Separation, Divorce, and Woman Abuse” (1996)
2:1 Violence Against Women 63. The article provides insight into
how domestic violence impacts divorce negotiations.
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rules is cherished precisely based on the assumption that
freedom of choice enables people to enhance their wellbeing. However, this assumption does not hold for women
in violent relationships, as they are not negotiating from a
position of equality. Men in coercive relationships can use
the children as bargaining chips to force women to agree to
unfavourable deals. They can assert control and dominance
through physical, psychological, economic, or sexual
violence. In an era of formal equality where shared custody
is normative,48 women are made increasingly vulnerable to
unequal results, as their efforts to protect themselves and
their children from dangerous custody outcomes further
disrupts their ability to negotiate fair economic outcomes.49
FOCUSING THE LAW ON THE NEEDS OF THOSE
WHO NEED IT
The proposals I make throughout this article depart from
Quebec family law’s 150-year-old grounding in
voluntarism and liberal individualism reaffirmed in the
recent Quebec v A50 decision and the 600-page Roy

48

See Denyse Côté & Florina Gaborean, “Nouvelles normativités de la
famille: la garde partagée au Québec, en France et en Belgique”
(2015) 27:1 CJWL 22 at 24.

49

See Dale Bagshaw et al, “The Effect of Family Violence on PostSeparation Parenting Arrangements: The Experiences and Views of
Children and Adults from Families Who Separated Post-1995 and
Post-2006” (2011) 86 Family Matters 49 at 59; Miranda Kaye, Julie
Stubbs & Julia Tolmie, “Domestic Violence, Separation and
Parenting: Negotiating Safety Using Legal Processes” (2003) 15:2
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 73 at 73.

50

Quebec (Attorney General) v A, supra note 6.
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Report.51 This change of paradigm is called for by a
reflection on family law reform that centres women’s
realities. At the intersection of poverty and violence, we
find women unable to afford equal and autonomous
bargaining. Affirming the importance of autonomy and
formal equality does not change this reality.
Thinking through the law from the perspective of
someone who cannot afford optimal, informed, and free
legal choices is not centring the margins, but being
realistic. It is the rich, white, autonomous, free-fromviolence woman who is the exception—not Irma or
Victoria. Centring real rather than idealized family
circumstances is also pragmatic. Because people and
families have varied needs and vulnerabilities, family law
needs to be centred around those who need it the most. It is
only logical to centre family law, by default, around the
position of groups of people who are unable to opt out, for
whom the stakes are higher, or who represent an important
fraction of legal subjects. Centring poverty and domestic
violence means paying attention to the needs of particular
groups to make for better law for everyone. The proposed
reform does the opposite.
What about women who have the means to tailor
the law to their needs and who are in equal relationships—
would it be unfair and perhaps paternalistic to impose on
them presumptions that they are vulnerable and in need of
protection? It is safer to err on the side of treating modern
couples as burdened by traditional unequal roles than to
treat unequal partners as independent and autonomous.
Indeed, modern, equal, financially comfortable couples are
51
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more able to make authentic legal choices and to
effectively derogate from default rules. Denise’s couple
has access to legal services and can negotiate on a nearequal footing. She needs good defaults the least because,
contrary to Irma and Victoria, she can create a law of her
own. Certainly, her independence is not absolute and, even
for privileged people, atomistic autonomy remains more
myth than reality. Yet in contrast with other characters, she
can adapt the law to her circumstances. Why, then, would
we design our default rules for her condition?
Based on this reasoning, we need a regime that
Denise can tailor to her lucky situation and that respects
Odile’s couple’s lesser degree of interdependence, but we
also need a law that protects Irma by default against
inaction, and we especially need a law that protects
Victoria by default and against her own consent. In other
words, we need a law that is protective by default, allowing
some opting out while maintaining a core of inalienable
entitlements to protect people in unequal relationships.
With the proposed reform’s excessive emphasis on
autonomy, Quebec deviates from this goal. Legislating for
Denise and Odile puts Irma and Victoria at risk. The
proposed reform fails the test of good family law.
THE TEST: WHERE WE EVALUATE THE
REFORM PROPOSAL FROM THE PERSPECTIVE
OF MARGINALIZED WOMEN
In this section, I apply my proposed test of family law to
three important changes proposed by the reform and the
Roy Report: the end of the mandatory sharing of family
patrimony, the change of the default matrimonial regime,

446

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 32, 2019]

and the limited protection of de facto partners. I use our
four characters to connect the anticipated consequences of
these changes to fictional but realistic women’s stories.
CHANGES FOR MARRIED COUPLES
The Context of Quebec’s Matrimonial Regime and
Family Patrimony
If it is not broken, fix it anyways is a reasonable appraisal
of the proposed changes examined in their historical
context. Until 1970, the matrimonial regime in Quebec was
one of community of property. The regime was unpopular,
with seventy percent of couples opting out to choose a full
separation of property.52 This choice was highly
detrimental for women and left many of them entirely
destitute upon separation.53 The situation was so critical
that the legislator had to intervene. In 1970, the legislator
changed the default matrimonial regime to the sharing of
acquests54 and, in 1989, it imposed the equal sharing of
family patrimony for married couples, with limited
exceptions.55 These changes dramatically reduced the use
52

See Danielle Burman, “Politiques législatives québécoises dans
l’aménagement des rapports pécuniaires entre époux: d’une justice
bien pensée a un semblant de justice – un juste sujet de s’alarmer”
(1988) 22:2 RJT 149 at 155.
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Québec à la lumière de l’arrêt Hartshorne” (2008) 292
Développements récents en droit familial, 45 at 63–4.
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Loi concernant les régimes matrimoniaux, LQ 1969, c 77.
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Loi modifiant le Code civil du Québec et d’autres dispositions
législatives afin de favoriser l’égalité économique des époux, LQ
1989, c 55.
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of marital agreements. In 2005, only ten percent of couples
signed a marriage contract.56 The briefs and parliamentary
debates on the family patrimony rules show a
preoccupation regarding the consequences of a
“contractual freedom” that is not gender neutral. As one
brief puts it: “without purporting to be sexist, we however
must realize that most of the time, in the choice of a
matrimonial regime, it is the man who sets the tone.”57 The
freedom to contractually opt for a full separation of
property has been experimented with in Quebec, and
deemed a failure, while the separation of acquests has
proved an adequate regime for most couples.
The concerns that led to the 1989 reform, meant “to
mitigate the injustices produced by the implementation of
a freely adopted matrimonial regime,”58 were known to
the Roy Committee. In his dissent, Dominique Goubau
argues that “we can label as a myth, especially in the
conjugal context, the belief that what has been negotiated
and mutually consented is necessarily fair.”59 He concludes
that “it is with circumspection that contractual freedom
56

See Alain Roy, “Le contrat de mariage en droit québécois: un destin
marqué du sceau du paradoxe” (2005) 51:4 McGill LJ 665 at 667.

57
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d’information juridique, Mémoire du partage à l’intention de la
commission parlementaire sur le partage des biens entre les époux
(Québec: TUPIJ, 1988) at 2.
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The Roy Report, supra note 4 at 584 [Dominique Goubau’s dissent,
author translation].
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must be given space in the domain of family and conjugal
relations.”60
The Proposed Reform for Married Couples
Abolishing the mandatory sharing of family patrimony and
rejecting the default sharing of acquests would turn back
the clock for women and heighten poor and victimized
women’s vulnerability.61 Protections that cannot be opted
out of would be limited to federal alimony rules (the
committee deplores that it cannot abolish them due to
constitutional constraints) as well as a new mandatory
parental regime that would only apply to parents and
include the possibility of a compensatory allowance.
Granted, the economic position of women in society has
changed since the 1970s. However, women still own less,
still earn less, and are still victimized by their partners to a
high degree. Because we have not yet reached a state of
equality between women and men, the proposed changes
would primarily penalize women and benefit men.
The proposal also invents autonomy problems
where none exist. Couples who want to escape the equal
sharing of family patrimony can already renounce it at the
end of the relationship. Real autonomy is not curtailed, but
rather sheltered from couples’ optimism bias and inability
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Ibid [author translation].
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I deliberately use victimized and not abused to avoid euphemizing
and normalizing connotations. See Michaël Lessard & Suzanne
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to predict the future.62 Moreover, the law already permits
unequal sharing in certain circumstances to avoid
injustices.63 Instead of tweaking the conditions for this
exception, the proposal needlessly opts for the more
extreme avenue.
In cases of so-called traditional marriages,
compensation regimes leave surpluses with the employed
partner rather than equalizing the position of breadwinner
and homemaker as sharing regimes do. If the Committee
wanted to soften sharing rules, less drastic avenues could
have been pursued, such as changing presumptions of
equal and unequal sharing of family patrimony. Allowing
a full opting out of family patrimony protections increases
the economic power of men over their (generally) poorer
partner. No adequate mechanisms to ensure that such
opting out does not result from or create opportunities for
coercive control are proposed.
Abandoning partnership of acquests as the default
regime is also misguided, given its popularity. Shifting the
default regime when the current one has a low rate of
opting out creates an undue burden on financially
precarious couples. Indeed, contracting out of a default
regime is expensive. The costs are not only financial but
also emotional, as marital contracts may create a “‘me
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See e.g. Belleau, supra note 22; Hélène Belleau, “D’un mythe à
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versus you’ mentality” and have negative signalling64 to
which violent men can react particularly badly.
Sharing acquests is also valuable socially because
it attenuates economic inequalities between breadwinner
and homemaker as well as between unequally remunerated
women and men. This regime has been adopted in
numerous civil law jurisdictions, including France, Poland,
and Spain, and is considered more appropriate to modern
life than a full community of property.65 It sometimes
includes residual discretion for judges to order an unequal
sharing of acquests in exceptional circumstances. While
the sharing of acquests is not appropriate for all couples,
those who wish to maintain a higher degree of financial
independence should bear the burden of opting out of the
protective regime, rather than the other way around. As I
have argued, protective defaults make better law than nonprotective defaults because of the relative ease of opting
out experienced by those who do not need protection
compared to those who do.
The change proposed by the Roy Committee cannot
be brushed aside as an inconsequential decision that leaves
couples with the freedom to reproduce the previous regime.
64

See Helen Reece, “Leaping Without Looking” in Robert Leckey, ed,
After Legal Equality: Family, Sex, Kinship (Abingdon, UK:
Routledge, 2015) 115 at 120.
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Law and Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014) 138; Jens M Scherpe,
“The Financial Consequences of Divorce in a European Perspective”
in Jens M Scherpe, ed, European Family Law Vol III – Family Law in
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Defaults are too sticky, not only for the reasons we have
seen but also due to optimism bias. Couples consistently
underestimate the likelihood of separation. Couples’
inaction is not entirely irrational, as optimism satisfies
marital expectations, turning into a self-fulfilling
prophecy.66 In that context, could not having to choose be
more valuable than the freedom to choose?67
Voices of Four Married Women
In a society in which women continue to earn less than their
male partners and to provide more domestic and emotional
labour, it is not hard to see that it is women who will pay
the price of the new regime’s purported “modernity.” But
women are not all similarly situated, as we can explore
through the fictional testimonies of our four characters.
Denise:
My partner and I discussed signing a marital
agreement, but our notary told us that with
the default regime we would remain
financially independent regarding our
income and share our family home and car.
This matched what we both wanted, so we
didn’t bother with making a contract.
Ten years later, we are about to divorce. We
have two young children. Even though we
66

See Sandra L Murray & John G Holmes, “A Leap of Faith? Positive
Illusions in Romantic Relationships” (1997) 23:6 Personality &
Social Psychology Bulletin 586 at 598.
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decided to share the parental work, I have had
to take a maternity leave and work part-time.
My ex now earns thirty percent more than I
do. I am told by my lawyer that I may receive
a compensatory allowance, but it won’t be
high because my ex also refused a promotion
due to our situation.
I am now looking for a new home with three
bedrooms, close to the children’s school and
to my work. It won’t be easy to find a place I
can afford, and I’m told child support will be
low due to us sharing custody, but I think I
can make it work.
Odile:
Chris and I were both married before and had
children of our own. We decided to think
things through before making it official.
Chris still resented the support he was paying
his ex. I wanted to make sure that what my
late husband left me would be my children’s
when I died.
After consulting a notary, we chose to sign a
marriage contract. Separation of property.
Chris and I agreed we both wanted to protect
our children. We were past retirement and
were not planning on buying a house, so I
thought it would make no difference either
way.
When we got married and moved in together,
I stopped receiving aid from the government.
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I did not have a lot of money of my own,
because I raised four children. Chris
supported me.
When we separated, I found myself poorer
than I ever was. A legal clinic worker told me
since I had no children with Chris I could not
get compensatory support. They told me to
negotiate spousal support, but Chris says he
owes me nothing since we were married only
for a few years.
Irma:
We got married when I became pregnant with
our first child. I never thought about the legal
stuff. It was important for us and our families
that we got married. So, we did. We couldn’t
afford for me to stop working. We always
worked hard to make it to the end of the
month. We have three beautiful children.
For a while, our marriage was not going well.
He says he wants to divorce. I did not know
how it worked here in Quebec. I asked for
help at the women’s centre. They said we
share family patrimony but not income. We
do not own our apartment or a car. They say
I can apply for child and spousal support. We
had some money saved but now he says it’s
all his money because he earned it. I could not
save up from what I made as a housecleaner,
we needed to pay rent and the groceries. I
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thought we shared what we both earned for
the family.
Victoria:
When we got married, he convinced me to
sign a marriage contract. He said it was for
tax purposes. I wanted us to share earnings,
but he said it was not necessary. He said I was
the love of his life and he would always take
care of me.
The violence started when I was pregnant. I
miscarried. I lost my job due to my
depression. He asked me not to look for a new
job. He wanted me at home.
I have been thinking of leaving him. I went to
a women’s centre for a few nights. He says I
am nothing without him and I should come
back. A volunteer helped me assess my
options. She said because I signed that
marriage contract, the house is all his. I might
not have a roof over my head if I leave him. I
don’t want to live on the streets. She says he
does not owe me compensation because we
don’t have children. Even though I lost my
job after my miscarriage. I have a shot at
spousal support though, if I can convince the
Court. If I had not signed that stupid contract,
we would automatically have shared the
house. I feel betrayed.
My friend says I should still leave him. I’m
not sure I can make it on my own.
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CHANGES FOR UNMARRIED COUPLES
Context for Cohabitation Reforms
For many in Quebec, cohabitation is equivalent to
marriage. Almost two-thirds of children are born to
unmarried parents.68 In 2013, seventy-one percent of
cohabitants believed they were as good as married in terms
of mutual obligations and inheritance rights, despite media
coverage of the Quebec v A decision.69 Yet, cohabitants
who have lived together for thirty years and raised three
children are still not truly “family” in the eyes of the law.
While Quebec law has adapted the doctrine of unjust
enrichment to allow for compensation in extreme cases of
unfairness, this mechanism is costly and uncertain.70
Debates regarding the regulation of unmarried
family members include how broad to cast the net, how
deep the obligations should be, and whether the regime
should be opt-in or opt-out.71 These questions are
interrelated, as an opt-in regime justifies deeper
obligations, and a wide opt-out net (for example, applying
not only to committed unions but also to siblings living
68
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82.
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together) calls for shallower regulation.72 There is no single
modern solution to juggle these factors, although the
functional assimilationist approach to cohabitation has
been gaining ground. Equality considerations first led New
Zealand to assimilate certain cohabitants to married
couples, with Australia slowly following suit in all but one
state. Some Canadian provinces adopt this position, with
Balkan states as figurehead for the assimilationist model.73
Non-assimilationist defaults extend some but not all
consequences of marriage to de facto couples—generally
maintenance but not property sharing.74 Opt-in regimes
such as the French civil solidarity pacts (PACS) provide
some cohabitants (generally the rich and educated) a
thinner set of obligations. In general, opt-in solutions do
not solve the “cohabitation problem,” which includes lack
of awareness of legal consequences, legal inaction even
when people would prefer mutual obligations, and power
differences between the spouse who wants and the spouse
who does not want to formalize the union.75
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The Proposed Reform for Unmarried Couples
The Roy Report proposes a limited default regime that
would only apply to cohabiting parents. Founded on the
shared responsibility to contribute to the expenses of the
family, the regime would be purely compensatory, with no
default sharing or support obligations. The proposal would
presume that partners who have lived together for twenty
years without having common children are financially
independent.
The preference for a very limited default regime
rests on the autonomy argument: the argument that the law
should respect the choice of cohabitants to remain
unmarried and that remaining unmarried means choosing
to be free from mutual financial obligations. This logic fails
to account for the impact of the parents’ “choice” on the
child’s life.76 Indeed, opt-in regimes that perpetuate
unmarried women’s poverty upon separation create poor
children, yet these children had no say in their parents’
marital status.77
The autonomy argument has also lost credibility in
recent years as new research has exposed the reasons why
people do not get married. Indeed, research shows that
cohabitants have varied attitudes toward marriage. The
cohabiting population includes:
(i) those cohabiting short-term, perhaps early
in life and largely for convenience, rather
76
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than in consequence of a long-term
commitment; (ii) those cohabiting by way of
trial-marriage, contemplating but having not
yet made a long-term commitment analogous
to marriage; (iii) those cohabiting with a new
partner following the dissolution of a
marriage to another person, deliberat[ely]
choosing not to make the specific
commitment of marriage again; (iv) those
who choose cohabitation in preference to
marriage but who regard their relationship in
many
respects,
including
long-term
commitment, as analogous to it.78
It is one thing to deny mutual obligations to couples
in a trial marriage (a short-term, fragile relationship) or to
those who purposefully do not marry to avoid mutual
obligations. It is another when people refuse to marry for
ideological reasons (rejecting the symbolism, but not the
legal obligations of marriage, or rejecting some but not all
rules) or for financial reasons (for example, they cannot
afford a wedding and are waiting for the right time to
marry, cohabitation is not chosen but marriage is
continually
delayed).79
For
some
cohabitants,
“cohabitation replaces marriage as a long-term living
arrangement.”80 Among the many differences between
78
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marriage and cohabitation—religious, legal, social,
economic—why assume that it is specifically the legal
support and property sharing aspects that cohabitants are
rejecting? As Barlow puts it, “[c]ertainly there is no
evidence that the majority of cohabitants are seeking to
avoid the legal implications of marriage. Rather the
majority believe they are already subject to them.”81
What about couples in which one person wants to
marry and the other does not? This was the case in Quebec
v A, yet the Supreme Court used the rhetoric of choice and
autonomy to justify the discriminatory treatment of the
claimant.82 As Masha Antokolskaia explains, “sometimes
the economically stronger partner deliberately frustrates
the institutionali[z]ation of cohabitation or the registration
of marriage in order to deprive the weaker party of legal
protection.”83 Thus, poverty and lack of power (including
power imbalance due to intimate partner violence) strip
from categories of women the supposed “autonomy” of
choosing one’s conjugal status. This means that it is
dangerous to generalize about what cohabitants choose to
justify rules which have damaging social and distributive
consequences. Such an approach also contradicts my
proposed centring method by treating women with
81
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diminished power in their relationship (be it due to poverty
or intimate partner violence) as exceptions rather than
central cases.
If the choice argument fails, a minimalistic regime
cannot be presumed to be any more autonomy-enhancing
than a denser regime. Realism and pragmatism are also
absent from the reform. The proposed opt-in regime
“assume[s] a degree of self-interest, legal knowledge and
common sense that is in fact lacking at the crucial time.”84
In the real world, “most people do not make relationship
choices based on the rational criteria assumed by
legislators and policy makers, but rather according to a
rationality prevailing in their own lives.”85 Couples’
confusion would be exacerbated by increased complexity
in the law: replacing two statuses (married or unmarried)
with four (married with a child, married without a child,
unmarried with a child, or unmarried without a child).
In deciding to let cohabitants fend for themselves in
defining their union, the Government of Quebec and the
Roy Committee want to avoid imposing unwanted
obligations on modern relations. However, considering the
impacts of inequality, optimism bias,86 misinformation,87
irrationality, and the costs of contracting,88 this approach
84
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sacrifices the one-size-fits-most approach for the one-sizefits-none.
Voices of Four Unmarried Women
Denise
When we started dating, neither of us was
ready to get married. Things became more
serious and I moved in with him. We decided
to wait before planning a wedding. We kept
our finances partially separate, and I rented
rather than sold my apartment in case things
did not work out.
After two years, we decided to separate—it
was better that way. Thankfully, we had no
children. I just packed my things and left. I’m
happy I don’t have to go through a long and
painful divorce, although I wonder if one of
the reasons that we broke up is that we never
fully committed. I am back in my old place
and trying to move forward with my life.
Odile
When I met Chris, I was not in a rush to get
remarried. He said he didn’t want to for legal
reasons. I thought it made sense and that it
might be a good way to honour my late
husband. I asked my notary if my relationship
with Chris would affect my will, and he said
no. I wanted to make sure my children were
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protected, even though they are now grown
up.
We moved to a fancy neighbourhood, and I
had to use my savings to pay my part of the
rent. The idea of getting married resurfaced,
but he did not seem to want that, and I did not
push it. He never proposed despite my hints.
He said that when we moved to our new
condo, we would own it together. That way,
I would be protected. When we did, I
assumed he remembered the plan. He was
stressed, and I did not want to complicate
matters. He always got so sensitive when he
thought I was protecting myself in case I
wanted to leave him.
He kept his finances separate, but he
provided for me. He passed suddenly six
years into our relationship. That’s when I
learned the condo was only in his name. He
had no will, so everything went to his
children, and I had to leave our home. I am
now living with my daughter, who is not
thrilled but doesn’t say anything. She helps
pay my medical bills. Funny how you always
think these things only happen to others.
Irma
We wanted to get married when I got
pregnant with our first child. Money was
tight—we decided to wait until we could
afford a small wedding. Life got in the way,
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and we never married. We had three children.
We worked double shifts to provide for them.
He said last week he wants to separate. He
said I should leave the apartment. I asked for
help at a women’s centre. They said I will not
get spousal support because we are not
married, and I will not get compensation
because I did not stop working for the
children. They helped me calculate the child
support I can get. I do not know how I will be
able to afford a roof over my head and my
children’s. I am trying to convince Damien
not to leave me.
Victoria
My partner and I had been living together for
almost a year when I started speaking of
marriage. I thought it would be more
romantic, but for him, it was out of the
question. I was never able to convince him.
When he became violent, I started to fear that
he did not love me like I loved him. After I
miscarried, my friends told me I should leave
him, but he promised to change. He seemed
to deeply regret what had happened.
After my depression, I did not return to work.
I became worried about what would happen
to me if he left. I was anxious to address the
question directly, and one day, I got the
courage to ask that we get married or sign a
cohabitation contract. I was pregnant again,
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and I thought it was a good moment to fortify
our relationship. He got so mad. He said:
“Why are you talking about a contract? Are
you about to leave me? Are you cheating on
me?” He said, if I left him, he would kill
himself, and it would be my fault. I did not
bring up the topic again.
Since my second miscarriage, he has become
very controlling with what I do, what I can
buy. I have no money—I cannot find a job,
and I no longer qualify for assistance because
he earns a lot. What I had saved is now long
gone. He owns the house and the car, and he
has invested for his retirement. Even if I
could leave him, where would I go?
I feel trapped.
THE RESULTS: WHERE WE IDENTIFY THREE
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS WITH THE
AUTONOMY-CENTRIC REFORM
The reform promises difficulties for people affected by
poverty, domestic violence, and the very much related
inability to engage in paid work. It fails to centre the needs
of vulnerable women and instead creates more
vulnerability due to three fundamental errors, which I will
discuss in the following sections.
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PROBLEM 1: A QUESTIONABLE CONCEPTION
OF AUTONOMY
The reform’s recognition of “diversity”89 actually favours
a golden model of independence. The cost of autonomy is
not evenly distributed among legal subjects. While Denise
(educated and financially independent) and Odile (having
experienced a first marriage) can make more
autonomous—albeit unfavourable—legal choices, Irma
(lacking financial resources) and Victoria (being in a
controlling relationship) are penalized by increased
autonomy. The reform project takes freedom of contract as
proxy for autonomy and as the perfect solution to family
law problems. Yet, history teaches us that
contractualization can betray married women90 and is of
little assistance in solving the cohabitation problem.91 In
fact, the whole point of family law is that regular contract
and property law are ill-adapted to the family context.92
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See Ministère de la Justice, “Family Law Reform”, supra note 2 at 3,
7.

90

See Grassby, supra note 53.
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See Louise Langevin, “Liberté de choix et protection juridique des
conjoints de fait en cas de rupture: difficile exercice de jonglerie”
(2009) 54:4 McGill LJ 697; Louise Langevin, “Liberté contractuelle
et relations conjugales: font-elles bon ménage?” (2009) 28:2
Nouvelles questions féministes 24.
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See e.g. American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations (St Paul, MN: American
Law Institute, 2002) at 1063ff (comment c on § 7.02, “Special
circumstances applicable to agreements about family dissolution”);
Scherpe, supra note 65.
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Relational autonomy theorists contest the
association of autonomy with independence and selfsufficiency.93 Giving effect to interdependent relationships
and promoting equality within relationships is more
autonomy-enhancing than mere freedom to contract. Is
Victoria really more autonomous when she has the choice
to opt out of protections than when she has the choice to
leave a violent relationship? The Roy Committee itself
recognizes that more freedom does not always lead to
autonomy, since it argues for keeping and even
strengthening the impossibility for Quebec women to take
their husband’s name.94 Unfortunately, this insight does
not carry to proposals regarding the financial consequences
of unions.
However, it is true that some people can and want
to make autonomous legal decisions. The problem is that
the people most likely to be autonomous in their choice of
regime are also the ones who model for the default. A more
protective default regime would be better adapted to
Victoria’s unequal relationship without infringing on
Denise’s and on independent couples’ capacity to choose
their own regime—a form of asymmetric paternalism.95 As
Justice Abella argues in Quebec v A:

93

See e.g. Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, Relational autonomy:
Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 4.

94

See The Roy Report, supra note 4 at 130.

95

See Colin Camerer et al, “Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral
Economics and the Case for ‘Asymmetric Paternalism’” (2003) 151:3
U Pa L Rev 1211 at 1212.
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opt in protections may well be adequate for
some de facto spouses who enter their
relationships with sufficient financial
security, legal information, and the deliberate
intent to avoid the consequences of a more
formal union. But their ability to exercise
freedom of choice can be equally protected
under a protective regime with an
opt out mechanism. The needs of the
economically vulnerable, however, require
presumptive protection no less in de
facto unions than in more formal ones.96
In terms of autonomy, we have little to gain and
much to lose in restricting protective default regimes.
Moreover, default entitlements affect outcomes of
negotiations.97 A default protective regime can attenuate
unequal power distributions (due to economic disparities
and controlling behaviour) by giving the weaker partner
bargaining chips to arrive at a fairer solution, even if the
protections allow for opting out. For example, if Victoria
has property entitlements, she can use them to negotiate
spousal support (or custody if she had a child). When she
has nothing to bargain with, her ability to negotiate opting
into property sharing is minimal and certainly not
comparable to Denise’s ability to opt out of it.

96

Quebec (Attorney General) v A, supra note 4 at para 372 (Justice
Abella).

97

See Robert H Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, “Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce” (1979) 88:5 Yale LJ 950
at 968.
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The reform would not allow everyone to tailor their
own regime to their needs. Behind a façade of choice for
all hides a normative preference for independent conjugal
life that, in a society still marked by profound gender (and
race, and class, and ability) inequalities, is wishful
thinking.
In conclusion, we do not make wins on the
autonomy front by approaching family law with
minimalistic obligations and freedom of contract. Nor do
we appropriately respond to the diversity of families that
includes situations of poverty and violence. The reform
proposal fails on its own evaluative standards.
PROBLEM 2: THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE
INTERACTION
Régine Tremblay observes that “[w]hile being technically
outlaws to civil law, de facto unions nonetheless produce
various effects in Quebec.”98 The all-important choice of
financial independence by unmarried partners is for
instance disregarded by the Taxation Act, the Individual
and Family Assistance Act, and other social laws.99
Consider Victoria’s situation in the cohabiting
scenario. Victoria can lose welfare benefits or even spousal
support
from
a
former
husband
on
the
98

Régine Tremblay, “Sans Foi, Ni Loi. Appearances of Conjugality and
Lawless Love” in Anne-Sophie Hulin, Robert Leckey & Lionel
Smith, eds, Les apparences en droit civil (Cowansville: Yvon Blais,
2015) 155 at 161.
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Taxation Act, RLRQ c I-3, art 2.2.1; Loi sur l'aide aux personnes et
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irrebuttable presumption that her partner shares his
resources. However, family law does not command such
sharing. Erez Aloni labels the public law recognition of
Victoria’s union as “deprivative recognition”.100 People
who “belong to particularly vulnerable populations, such
as those who qualify for means-tested programs”101 and
couples (including lesbian couples) “where both partners
are at a low income level”102 are likely to experience partial
recognition as producing disadvantages overall.103 Quebec
family law thus maintains a double-standards system that
penalizes low-income people without consideration for
their conjugal choices.
In Victoria’s case, the interaction between public
and private law creates forced dependence—not individual
autonomy. At the intersection of poverty and violence,
women are made vulnerable to economic violence,
especially if they cannot work due to disability, precarious
status, or conjugal violence. Hence, “the legislature’s
inclusion of de facto spouses in social and fiscal laws
during their union exacerbate[s] their exclusion from the
private law’s obligation of support.”104
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Erez Aloni, “Deprivative Recognition” (2013) 61:5 UCLA L Rev
1276 at 1281–82.
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Ibid at 1276.
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Boyd, supra note 42 at 378.
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See Claire FL Young, “Taxing Times for Lesbians and Gay Men:
Equality at What Cost” (1994) 17 Dal LJ 534 at 535.

104

Robert Leckey, “Strange bedfellows” (2014) 64:5 UTLJ 641 at 655;
See also Langevin, “Liberté de choix”, supra note 91 at 714.
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Upon separation, shallow family obligations not
only exacerbate economic disparities between women and
men, but also tie up state resources, as seen in Odile’s case.
Nordic countries are a case on point to understand the
interaction of public and private responses to poverty. In
Nordic countries, “covering post-marital ‘need’ is not
necessarily the responsibility of the former spouse.”105
Rather, “any citizen in need (even as the result of a
relationship breakdown), is entitled to state support.”106 In
Sweden, for example, maintenance after divorce is limited,
and obligations between separating cohabitants are
minimal. This contrasts with the Balkan states where even
for cohabitants, support obligations are mandatory.107
The reform would introduce Nordic-like family law
without Nordic-like welfare. Poverty has important
societal, economic, and public health consequences. Poor
women (and their children) must be assisted, be it through
socialization or privatization.
The former may be preferable to the latter,
especially when considering the limits of privatized
remedies for black women.108 Boyd also writes that
assigning responsibility for women’s poverty to individual
105

Jens M Scherpe, “Contracting Out of the Default Relationship
Property Regime – Comparative Observations” in Jessica Palmer et
al, eds, Law and policy in modern family finance: property division in
the 21st century (Cambridge, UK: Intersentia, 2017) at 367.
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men with whom they have recognized relationships means
that “responsibility for the costs of social reproduction and
for economic hardship remains privatized, and the
gendered relations of dependency are thereby
reinforced.”109 A possible counter-argument is that dense
family responsibilities could incentivize men to support
rather than hinder their partner’s career and quest for
financial security. In any case, until a reform of social laws
is on the table, rejecting the private solution results in
continued
precarity—a
position
from
which
underprivileged women cannot enjoy their high-priced
autonomy.
PROBLEM 3: A REDUCTIVE VIEW OF
INEQUALITY
The reform advances a reductive view of inequality,
recognizing only relationship-generated and childrenrelated disadvantages. This project may suit the needs of
Denise, who is financially independent until she bears
children (although she will still end up undercompensated).
Our other characters show different vulnerabilities.
Odile enters her relationship having already
suffered relationship- and gender-related disadvantages.
She “has suffered the economic differential within the
labour market of being both a woman, once-a-wife and a
mother,”110 while her partner has benefitted from the
financial benefits of being a man and husband. Irma’s
109

Boyd, supra note 29 at 177.

110

Anne Bottomley, “From Mrs. Burns to Mrs. Oxley: Do Co-Habiting
Women (still) Need Marriage Law?” (2006) 14:2 Fem Leg Stud 181
at 191.
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salary is affected by gender and racial discrimination,
making her unable to afford maternity leave. The effects of
child-bearing on her earning capacity are subtler than for
Denise. The compensation model fails these characters,
and would also fail “the wife who did not acquire
marketable skills before marriage, precisely because she
intended to be home with children and to make that
substantial marital investment.”111 Women’s poverty is
multifaceted, and only granting relevance to the direct
consequences of child-rearing is reductive.
Gender bias also surfaces in opt-in regimes that
demand actions—insisting on a contract, negotiating in
one’s self-interest—that are at odds with expected
feminine behaviour. As Anne Bottomley explains, “women
and men deploy language, conversations and silences
differently—and that this leaves women crucially
disadvantaged in an area of law which requires express
discussions on express issues.”112 Emotional vulnerability
adds to economic vulnerability. Like Odile, “[w]omen will
too often hope for the best”113 and become vulnerable to a
man’s controlling behaviour,114 while he secures his
economic investments and decides whether the union
should be formalized.
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Lastly, the reform proposal ignores domestic
violence as relationship-generated inequality. Violence
makes it doubtful that any decision of the couple reflects
the victim’s autonomy. Women’s vulnerability is worsened
by both the reduction of mandatory protections and the
opting-in logic. The law can nullify contracts signed under
coercive circumstances,115 but how can it protect Victoria
against not signing a cohabiting contract due to her
partner’s violence? Further, the regime ignores the effects
that domestic violence can have on earning capacity,
irrespective of child-rearing.116
THE BETTER WAY: WHERE WE SEPARATE THE
JUSTIFICATION MECHANISM OF
COMPENSATION
How can these problems be remedied? The best option
would be to abandon a vision of marriage based on
individual responsibility and compensation. The proposed
compensatory mechanism would perpetuate gender
inequalities, create perverse incentives, substitute fairness
for proportionality, rarely be applicable despite its
supposedly mandatory character, and create a
disadvantageous anchoring effect that would curtail
awards.117
115

See Miglin v Miglin, 2003 SCC 24 at para 81.
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See The Roy Report, supra note 4 at 588 (Dominique Goubau’s
dissent); Kathryn Showalter, “Women’s employment and domestic
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et accessible”, Brief presented to the Quebec Minister of Justice in

474

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 32, 2019]

In case the Roy Report’s compensation logic gains
traction, it is important to understand that a compensation
logic can still lead to different results if we untangle
justification, entitlement, and remedy.
SOLUTION 1: FIXING ENTITLEMENT
CONDITIONS
Even on a compensation rationale, the Committee’s
eligibility rules are underinclusive. Compensation can be
called for when spouses do not have common children.
Here are a few examples of women who would be denied
access to the new compensatory regime:
•
•
•

•

Lucie has lived with Marc for ten years. She has
experienced two miscarriages leading to depression
and loss of employment.
Clara has lived with Lucas for eight years. She has
experienced constant conjugal violence affecting her
ability to engage in paid work.
Camilla quit her job and moved to a new city so that
her partner John could accept a promotion. Finding a
new job took her six months, and her salary dropped by
twenty-five percent.
Stephanie has lived with Eric for thirty years. Since
they moved in together, she has not engaged in paid
work. She took care of first Eric’s children from a

the context of public consultations on family law reform (28 June
2019) at 10–12, online (pdf):
<www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/contenu/documents/
Fr__francais_/centredoc/publications/ministere/dossiers/consultation/
cdf2019_zaccour_FFQ.pdf>.
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previous marriage, then his demanding career, and
finally his aging parents.
A compensation logic does not take us to a single
obvious set of rules. Because having a child is not the only
cause of financial interdependence, many jurisdictions
extend eligibility to cohabitation remedies to partners who
have been in a stable relationship, meaning “passing as
married”118 in terms of the nature or specific duration of
the relationship.119 Manitoba defines three routes to
remedies for unmarried spouses: registration, having lived
together for a year and having a child, or having lived
together for at least three years.120 There are other possible
definitions, such as having a child121 or having suffered a
relationship-generated disadvantage122 (which should
include intimate partner violence). Interestingly, Scotland
imposes no minimum duration or child requirement, but
uses self-limiting remedies that depend on the economic
disadvantage linked to the relationship.123 What the
Quebec reform proposes to do through eligibility, Scotland
does at the quantum stage. Since the proposed remedy
118

Rebecca Probert, The Changing Legal Regulation of Cohabitation:
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requires evaluating the partners’ disproportionate
contributions, the bright-line rule suggested by the Roy
Committee is not necessary to dissuade unmeritorious
claims.124 In other words, if a childless woman has suffered
no disadvantage, she will be unable to satisfy the other
conditions for claiming a compensatory allowance.
Eligibility responds to two categories of concerns.
The practical concern calls for clarity and avoidance of
messy disputes. The normative concern is to identify
relationships deserving of marriage-like or other remedies.
The reform proposal provides clear-cut rules but fails the
normative test. A possible compromise would be to define
a high length threshold (for example, five or ten years) or
to allow cohabitants without children to qualify for
remedies if they disprove a presumption of financial
independence or lack of relationship-generated
disadvantage. But since the remedy will depend on proving
disproportionate contributions, there is little use in preidentifying with categorical rules the kinds of relationships
where disproportionate contributions may happen.
SOLUTION 2: FIXING THE REMEDY FOR
DISPROPORTIONATE CONTRIBUTIONS
A compensation rationale does not, as the Roy Committee
asserts,125 preclude a remedy of property sharing or
periodical payments. Consider the spousal support
124

See also Robert Leckey, “Cohabitation, Law Reform, and the
Litigants” (2017) 31:2 Intl JL Pol’y & Fam 131 at 136 on the
floodgates argument.

125
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advisory guidelines, developed by Carol Rogerson and
Rollie Thompson and widely used by courts and litigants.
These guidelines have compensation as one of their main
rationales. Thompson explains that “[o]ne of the
fundamental problems of compensatory theory is the
complexity of the evidence required.”126 The guidelines
use other measures as proxies for gain and loss in the name
of efficiency and access to justice. Thompson emphasizes
that the guidelines “use ‘income sharing’ as a method of
constructing formulas, but not as an adoption of a general
philosophy of income sharing after separation.”127 As he
further explains, “[i]t is important to distinguish the use of
proxies . . . from the theory that underpins entitlement. The
fit does not have to be perfect, as long as it produces
tolerable results.”128
Like Rogerson and Thompson, the Roy Committee
recognizes the need for practical solutions and workable
guidelines. We do not yet know what compensatory
guidelines could look like, how monetary and nonmonetary contributions would be compared, and how the
different factors would come into play (including efforts to
minimize loss, ability to pay, and the advantages of the
matrimonial regime). However, we cannot cast aside the
risk that guidelines focused on proportionality (rather than
gain) would produce low awards. Compensatory regimes
pose evidential problems and penalize women whose
contributions tend to be less tangible (time rather than
money, emotional labor, etcetera) and less visible
126
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127
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(groceries rather than a down payment). Note that existing
compensatory mechanisms—the compensatory allowance
for married couples and unjust enrichment for unmarried
couples—are rarely used, hence the reform. As Laurence
Saint-Pierre Harvey observes, “the disproportionate
importance that evidence takes in cases of compensatory
allowance seems to stand in tension, and even to be
irreconcilable, with the idea of an accessible family
justice.”129 Family litigants can rarely afford to produce
adequate evidence of loss and gain, especially for careers
that do not have clear salary scales.130 Evidential
difficulties are exacerbated for poor, self-represented
litigants. This is why need-based analyses have often been
privileged by courts since Moge, despite its compensatory
rationale.131
Adopting another mechanism to fulfill the
compensation goal could attenuate these quantification and
evidential problems. Compensation can be achieved
though periodical awards or property sharing. For example,
English courts tend to apply the three fundamental
principles of needs, sharing, and compensation through
property allocation132 rather than separating as Quebec
does the pillars of property, maintenance, and
compensation.
129

Laurence Saint-Pierre Harvey, “Prestation compensatoire et union de
fait en droit québécois: Étude critique du discours judiciaire” (2018)
31:2 Can J Fam L 127 at 162 [author translation].

130

See Thompson, supra note 111 at 10.

131

See Carol J Rogerson, “Spousal Support After Moge” (1996) 14 Can
Fam LQ 281 at 285.

132

See Scherpe, supra note 105; Miller v Miller; McFarlane v
McFarlane, [2006] UKHL 24.

ALL FAMILIES ARE EQUAL, BUT DO SOME MATTER
MORE THAN OTHERS?

479

Opting for property division or periodical payments
as the remedy once litigants have passed the entitlement
hurdle would benefit access to justice.133 Discretionary and
evidentially burdensome solutions penalize the weaker or
marginalized party who is “likely to encounter barriers in
her invocation of assistance from the judiciary.”134 Further,
in compensatory support orders, “judges consistently
ignore or underestimate the compensatory disadvantage
going forward.”135 The logic of clean break embedded in
the one-time compensatory allowance limits the
compensation of the mother whose disproportionate
contribution happens post-separation. Indeed, the reform
would limit compensation after separation, requiring
special circumstances such as neglect by the non-custodial
parent or disability of the child.136 If parents bear equal
responsibility for common children, why does the
requirement of proportional contribution weaken after
separation?
A clean break logic is also limited by the payor’s
means at or around the time of separation, even though
disproportionate contributions may continue to affect the
mother (negatively) and the father (positively) for decades
to come. Poor women would receive even less money than
they are entitled to because their partner does not have the
money now. The one-time payment also requires

133
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hypothesizing about the future, while periodical payments
can be reviewed if the parties’ conditions change.
While noble, a clean-break objective is rarely
realistic.137 In a time when shared custody has become
normative, it is ironic that mothers’ autonomy can be
curtailed over the long run by custody orders,138 while their
resources are slashed by a clean-break logic. In any case, it
would be possible to have periodical payments as a default,
while allowing for the payment of a one-time sum when it
is adequate.
For a fair reform that truly compensates
disproportionate contributions, we would need either
refined eligibility criteria or a better choice of remedy.
Extending the entitlement to spousal support or equal
sharing of family patrimony to all couples who have
children or who can prove a relationship-generated
disadvantage would be one avenue to correct
underinclusiveness and to truly start recognizing the
diversity of families.
CONCLUSION: STILL WAITING FOR EQUALITY
Family law reforms are few and far between. Seemingly
lacking political appeal, this area of law affects almost
everyone, yet appears neglected in political campaigns,
societal debates, and feminist activism. Quebec’s reform
137
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project is, then, an important event. Unfortunately, what is
proposed to women is a mixed bag, with small
improvements being accompanied by high costs.
Domestic-violence victims are not protected from opting
out of sharing family patrimony, and the economic
consequences of violence are not considered in the
compensatory mechanisms. Underprivileged couples are
also penalized by the change in default matrimonial regime
and the perpetuation of an opt-in logic for de facto spouses.
If family law can be caricatured as “a Manichaean
struggle between atomistic liberalism and a socially
contextualized feminism,”139 the reform project
indubitably falls into the former camp. Quebec families
deserve the protection of family patrimony, partnership of
acquests, and default regulation of de facto unions. Yet, the
Roy Committee’s project chooses formal over substantial
equality, idealism over reality, and men over women. Let
it be buried six feet under until “all families are equal” can
be said without irony.
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